

ER-7-2884/A

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11 AUG 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Major General Robert A. Schow
Deputy C-2 (Foreign Operations)

SUBJECT : Intelligence on International Communism

REFERENCE : Memorandum of August 3, 1955 from
Major General Robert A. Schow, Deputy C-2
(Foreign Operations) to Chairman, IAC, on
"Intelligence on International Communism"

1. Intelligence needs relating to international communism are of deepest concern to this agency also. It is agreed that it would be desirable, as you propose, for the IAC to consider the establishment of a sub-committee to coordinate the efforts in this field. It is in connection with the USIA Survey, to which you refer, that CIA undertook discussions with the Department of State on the location of responsibility for and means to expand the production of intelligence on international communism. These discussions are now being concluded.

2. I propose to disseminate to the IAC in the near future for its consideration your memorandum together with my report on the outcome of the discussions between CIA and the State Department. We should be able to complete this report in time to permit consideration at the IAC meeting either on August 16 or 23.

ALLEN W. Dulles
Director

PCS/DCI:JQR:aml (8 August 1955)
Rewritten: O/DCI/VM:hrw (10 August 1955)
0 & 1 - forward

2 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DDP
1 - PCS/DCI
1 - PCS/DCI Chrono

Army
review(s)
completed.

Army

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Approved For Release 2003/04/24 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001200060066-3

ER 7-3004

8 August 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: General Schow's Memorandum on
"Intelligence on International Communism"

1. Attached (Tab A) for your signature is a reply to General Schow's memorandum of August 3 on international communism (Tab B).

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2. [redacted] and I both felt that it would be helpful if Mr. Armstrong could be informed of General Schow's memorandum in view of the former's current consideration of Mr. Bissell's pending recommendations on this subject (which are now ready for your signature). Accordingly I discussed the matter with Mr. Armstrong this morning. He promised to do his best to get any comments he might have on Mr. Bissell's recommendations to you by Wednesday or Thursday of this week. In view of the fact that the Bissell recommendations deal with an important segment of General Schow's recommendation, Mr. Armstrong felt (and I agree) that they should be considered together by the IAC.

3. I recommend that you sign and dispatch the memorandum at Tab A.

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[redacted]
Office of the Director
Planning and Coordination Staff

CONCUR: [Signature]

Deputy Director (Intelligence)

Cleared by phone with Helms. J.C.R.
Deputy Director (Plans)

APPROV: [redacted]

Attachments
PCS/DCL:JQR:aml (8 August 1955)

O & 2 - forward

1 - PCS/DCI
1 - PCS/DCI Chrono
1 - DDI
1 - DDP

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Executive Registry
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G2-PRW

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Intelligence on International Communism

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1. The Department of the Army is concerned by the serious inadequacy of available information on international Communism and by certain weaknesses in the intelligence community's handling of this subject. Two major weaknesses are considered to be (a) the lack of an adequate program for the production of basic intelligence on international Communism and (b) insufficient coordination of the total collection and production effort of United States intelligence agencies in this field. An example of such deficiency and a discussion of two measures necessary to the improvement of the handling of intelligence on international Communism are attached as Inclosure 1.

2. Reference is made to IAC-D-82/6 of 5 October 1954, Report to the IAC on Implementation of the Survey of USIA's Intelligence Needs and Assets. That document (page 3) states that "the question of the location of responsibility for expanded production on international Communism is currently under discussion between CIA and the Department of State".

3. In view of the above, the Department of the Army recommends that

a. the IAC request that the conclusions and recommendations resulting from the discussion between CIA and the Department of State be reported at an early date;

b. the IAC review the overall program for the collection and production of intelligence on international Communism in order to strengthen the total effort in this field; and

c. in the course of the recommended review the IAC consider:

(1) the assignment to a single agency of responsibility for maintaining and collating for the entire intelligence community the basic data in the field of international Communism.

(2) the activation of an IAC sub-committee to help coordinate the effort of the agencies in collecting and producing intelligence on international Communism.

Sgd: Robert A. Schow

1 Incl
Discussion (in dupl.)

Unable to determine
downgrading date

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Major General
Deputy in C. of C. of C.

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SECRET**DISCUSSION**

1. In illustration of existing inadequacies in the IAC agencies' intelligence on international Communism, the Department of the Army is handicapped by too little information on the covert aspects of Communist subversive activities, with particular reference to Communist capabilities for sabotage and armed action that will interfere with the operations of our armed forces overseas or those of our allies. An improved program of basic intelligence production is an essential step toward overcoming some of this deficiency. Of equal importance, however, is an increased collection effort, based on closer and more extensive cooperation between the collecting and producing offices.

2. Virtually all IAC agencies need basic data on international Communism that will enable them, for example, to assess local Communist activity or influence as a measure of regional or national Communist capabilities. Detailed information of this nature may be exploited in different ways to meet different agencies' specific requirements, e.g., a careful tabulation of local political and shop steward elections in Italy would help to gauge more accurately not only the trend of Communist political strength in that country but the Communist potential for armed action as well. No agency, however, now has the resources to perform this close analysis on a continuing basis. Supplementing the published NIS, therefore, the office recommended in paragraph 3c(1) of the basic memorandum would be responsible for maintaining files and preparing basic intelligence reports on specific aspects of Communist overt political or covert subversive activity, both as part of a planned, coordinated program and in response to an urgent request from any IAC agency.

3. An IAC directive of 26 May 1949 established the JIGSAW committee as a permanent inter-departmental committee "to plan and coordinate production of intelligence in the field of international Communism, as it affects the national security". In the year that it met regularly, the committee did useful groundwork. Coordinated planning for the production of intelligence on international Communism is a continuing need. It is also obvious, however, that the covert nature of Communist subversive activity requires greater coordination of intelligence production and clandestine operations in this field to improve (1) support to the clandestine collection effort and (2) accuracy of the intelligence produced, including national estimates. The composition of the inter-agency committee recommended in paragraph 3c(2) of the basic memorandum should reflect these needs.